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Katz: France's New Cybersecurity Policy

NOTE
THE APPLICATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCE’S NEW
CYBERSECURITY POLICY
Jonathan Katz*

193

The prolific growth of technological advancements has undoubtedly
improved the quality of life for many, both directly and indirectly. However,
the integral role technology now plays in our society presents a plethora of
opportunities for the technologically-savvy to exploit; the consequences of
such, many world leaders are incapable of dealing with. The 2016 United
States Council of Economic Advisers estimated that pernicious operations
resulted in losses upwards of fifty billion dollars.194 Indeed, hackers have
intervened in governmental affairs, most notably in the fields of national
defense, central infrastructure, and information and communication
technologies (ICT). In most cases, these crimes cross international borders.
The need for a form of global governance was recognized in light of these
increasingly pervasive cybersecurity attacks. In 2019, the French Ministère
des Armées (Ministry of the Armies) released four major reports tackling the
issue of cybersecurity in the international sphere. The last report, “Droit
International Appliqué aux Opérations dans le Cyberespace” (In English:
International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace)195 stands out as a
watershed document on cybersecurity in international law. Despite its
apparent ambiguity, it pushes the global understanding of international law
as a powerful tool to mediate crises such as cybersecurity threats. The
document has established itself as a precedent and can be expected to
influence other countries in the upcoming months.196
* B.A. Candidate for International Political Economy, Fordham College at Rose Hill, Class
of 2023. The opportunities provided by the Fordham Undergraduate Law Review and its
leadership are both innumerable, and invaluable. Their unwavering selfless support has
allowed their members to flourish and set the publication on a path for continued success.
On a more personal note, I would like to thank former Co-Managing Editor Naomi Izett for
her continued support, guidance, and oversight throughout the drafting and editing
processes. Without her, overcoming the complexities of international law would not have
been possible. Lastly, infinite thanks are due to my family whose continued support allows
me to engage in such rewarding opportunities.
194
The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy, The Council of Economic
Advisers (February 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/TheCost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf.
195
Ministère des Armées, La Fabrique Défense (2017-2019), https://www.defense.gouv.fr.
196
Shortly after publication of France’s newest policy (December 2019), the Group of
Government Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security was called to discuss the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The comprehensive policy outlined in the International Law Applied to
Operations in Cyberspace draws primarily on two defining characteristics of
international law: sovereignty and customary law. While these principles are
application of international law to cybersecurity operations. Harriet Moynihan, The
Application of International Law to Cyberspace: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention, Just
Security, (December 13, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/67723/the-application-ofinternational-law-to-cyberspace-sovereignty-and-non-intervention/.
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widely accepted by most states, their inherent ambiguity can sometimes be
the cause of disputes.
The principle of sovereignty first arose in 1648 at the end of the Thirty
Years’ War which spawned the need for international regulations due to the
creation of numerous inclusions of numerous European provinces and states.
The Peace of Westphalia yielded two fundamental characteristics of
international law; the right to sovereignty and the right to a national
identity.197 The definition adopted at the time was influenced mostly by
positivist thought which asserted that a state’s right to govern itself was the
supreme law, and no moral authority could exist above it. The idea of
sovereign states has faced significant opposition by those who believed in
what is known as natural law, which promotes general goodwill between
nations based on preexisting philosophical and religious principles.198
Centuries later, the mass atrocities committed during the Second World War
would tip the scale in favor of the natural law interpretation.
This, paired with the formation of the United Nations (UN), created a
platform for the development of principles to govern globalization in a
increasingly interdependent world.199 Customary law is the fabric that holds
international principles and treaties together. It developed to fill in the “gray
areas” caused by the ambiguity of international laws. It represents the
commonly accepted international etiquette of politics. While it is by nature
more flexible it is recognized as a unique but powerful tool used by
international lawyers. Customary law and Sovereignty are often viewed as
important ideas which guide international law. This is undoubtedly why
France decided to use these widely recognized principles to support their
doctrine.
II. THE USAGE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN DROIT INTERNATIONAL

ALLIQUE AUX OPERATIONS DANS LE
The application of international law towards operations conducted in
cyberspace is as novel as the development of cyberspace itself. As society
develops, it looks to international law to guide the legal precedents that will
shape future international politics. But what provides structure to these
doctrines? The first is one of the most debated concepts in international law:
sovereignty. Presumably, nations would look to the UN, the principal
197
David and Keitner Bederman, Chimene, International Law Frameworks (Concepts and
Frameworks, Foundation Press (February 24, 2016).
198
Id.
199
Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations, Introduction and General International Law in Cyberspace, Cambridge
University Press (2017).

Published by Fordham Research Commons,

3

Fordham Undergraduate Law Review, Vol. 2 [], Art. 5

2020

FORDHAM UNDERGRADUATE LAW REVIEW

49

international governing body, to define such a term. However, the UN has
avoided issuing a concrete definition of sovereignty. Article 2.1 of the UN
Charter highlights that “the organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”200 Despite ongoing lack of
clarification regarding the term, consensus among states finds that
sovereignty is viewed as “the principle that each State answers only to its
own domestic order and is not answerable to a larger international
community, except to the extent it has consented to be.”201 Many UN member
states accept these conditions, one of which is being open to external
intervention under specific circumstances. The definition purposefully leaves
that open to interpretation, as is customary with international law. France,
along with other nations before it (See Section V: A,B,C,D,E), have used the
ambiguous definition of sovereignty to develop necessary international
cyberspace policies that fall within the scope of international law.
III. THE USAGE OF CUSTOMARY IN DROIT INTERNATIONAL ALLIQUE

AUX OPERATIONS DANS LE CYBERSPACE
The definition of sovereignty accepted by the international community is
an example of customary law at work. The ability for customary law to shape
the international political landscape while not necessarily being concrete, has
only further emphasized its importance to the international community. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 38 describe the
effectiveness of customary law:
Custom is ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law.’ To show a rule of
customary international law, one must prove to the satisfaction of the relevant
decisionmaker (whether an international tribunal, a domestic court, or a
governmental or inter-governmental actor) that the rule (1) has been followed as a
‘general practice,’ and (2) has been ‘accepted as law.’202

The guiding principles of international law are the only common
principles accepted. These general practices have served to advance
international law only to the extent that it need be. While, as a whole,
international law has proven to be ambiguous, customary law has served to
add clarity. A specific example of this can be seen with operations occurring
in cyberspace.

200

Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 1, United Nations (2019),
https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.
201
A/C.1/73/L.27, United Nations (October 2018), https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.27.
202
David and Keitner Bederman, Chimene, International Law Frameworks (Concepts and
Frameworks, Foundation Press (February 24, 2016).
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IV. IS A DOCTRINE CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE
SECURITY APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW?
International law is vast and complex. However, it can often be guided by
the two defining characteristics discussed above: sovereignty and customary
law. France’s doctrine is not the first time these characteristics have
formulated international policy; they have long been ingrained in
international law. Multiple mass atrocity crimes committed within the last
century have had rippling effects on politics and policies on a global scale,
each greater than the last. It is in support of this precedent that France has
constructed its doctrine which questions the role international law should play
in cybersecurity operations.
As is often the case with internationally applicable legal documents,
sovereignty is the linchpin of the ruling. France derives its perception of
proper jurisdiction from the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and ICT.
France assumes responsibility for its cyberspace, similar to how they would
for a municipality within its designated international borders. France assumes
total control over it and will carry out whatever means it deems necessary to
ensure its sovereignty. Any successful cyberattack that permeates, “State
digital systems, affects the military or economic power, security or survival
capacity of the Nation, or constitutes interference in France’s internal or
external affairs, will entail defensive cyber warfare operations that may
include neutralization of the effect.”203 France’s new cyberspace doctrine
applies appropriately to the above definition of sovereignty.
In the case of operations occurring in cyberspace operations, like other
international relations, ‘general practice’ is difficult to define. The rapid
development of technology has made a customary adoption of principles
challenging to abide by. However, four of the five members of the UN
Security Council have been able to formulate cybersecurity doctrines that are
formulated from many of the same principles. France’s doctrine follows a
number of these important precedents, the most notable being the customary
definition of sovereignty.204 Furthermore, the doctrine draws on the
commonly accepted practices of jus in bello (International Humanitarian
Law/IHL) when discussing what cyber-attacks may be categorized as an
armed conflict, which is also described under customary law to some extent
(some portions are defined, but the adaptation for it to fit under cyber-attacks
is new). The UN has drawn upon the customary laws followed by many of
its member-states. And in the case of cybersecurity, has used the various
203

Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations, Introduction and General International Law in Cyberspace, Cambridge
University Press (2017).
204
Ministère des Armées, La Fabrique Défense (2017-2019), https://www.defense.gouv.fr.
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doctrines to formulate international policy.205 Thus, International Law
Applicable to Operations in Cyberspace and other doctrines concerning
cyberspace are not only applicable to international law but are crucial in order
to suit the needs of a technologically advanced global society.
V. ADDITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS ON CYBERSPACE,

SOVEREIGNTY, AND AMBIGUITY
Before further exploring the question of ambiguity, it is worth analyzing
cybersecurity doctrines released by other nations prior to France's. The
document, while not the first of its kind, has set the most influential
precedent. France’s fellow members of the United Nations Foreign Security
Council have offered their perspectives.
A. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)
In May of 2018, Attorney General Jeremy Wright made a speech to the
public titled “Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century”. Many of his
remarks drew on the United States’ Department of Defense Law of War
Manual which would later be used to help draft National Cyber Strategy of
the United States of America. Wright made aggressive claims that cyber
operations merited physical countermeasures. Additionally, they negate the
widespread view that countermeasures need to be announced prior. To
protect and prevent violations of sovereignty, the speech outlines decisive,
yet ambiguous means for such. As is seen in France’s doctrine, certain “gray
areas” regarding when a breach of sovereignty merits physical force is
prominent throughout.206
B. The United States of America (US)
The United States of America (US): In September of 2018, President
Donald J. Trump released the National Cyber Strategy of the United States
of America. The document stood diametrically opposed to the goals regarding
cyberspace laid out by the previous presidential administration. Focus has
shifted from strictly defensive to offensive. The document promotes the use
of preventionist policies in order to maintain security of the nation’s
populous. Such change is affected by partisan differences however, evolving
205

Detlev Wolter, The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-09/un-takes-big-step-forward-cybersecurity.
206
Jeremy Wright, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century, Attorney General’s
Office (May 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-lawin-the-21st-century.
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global perspectives are observable. The document builds off pre-existing
cyber doctrine (such as the United Nations Convention Against TransNational Organized Crime and the G7 24/7 Network Points of Contact).207
Such advancement of prevention is reminiscent of neo-liberal interpretations
on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and its role of intervention. Similar
to the UK, while the doctrine is largely decisive, it leaves a great deal of
doctrine up for interpretation.
C. The Russian Federation (RU)
In October of 2018, RU proposed “A/C.1/73/L.27” which was meant to
counter the American doctrine adopted a month prior. Instead of promoting
effective countermeasures, they maintain the need for “cyber sovereignty”
and a nation's need to take care of their own cyberspace. Additionally, instead
of encouraging cooperation from the private sector (as is the case with the US
doctrine), it is deemed as unimportant.208 Whether or not one may believe
this exclusion due to “unimportance” is debatable, but it seems to discourage
the private sector’s participation in cyberspace. In response, the United States
proposed “A/C.1/73/L.37” as a means of implementing their national
doctrine in the international community.209
D. The People’s Republic of China (CN)
Besides expressing support for its fellow Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) member Russia on “A/C.1/73/L.27”, the CN
government has remained silent. They have neither confirmed nor denied
whether or not international law is applicable in cyberspace.
E. The Republic of France
France does not stray far from the perspective of its allies and often builds
upon their doctrine. The focal point of each doctrine is sovereignty (as is often
the case with policy concerning international law). Furthermore, general
cases in which this sovereignty may be violated are detailed. Yet, a problem
arises from this generality. Vague doctrine allows for vastly different
interpretations and speculation regarding what is, and is not, protected in
regard to sovereignty. However, vague doctrine and concrete doctrine both
207

National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America, The White House (September
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-CyberStrategy.pdf.
208
A/C.1/73/L.27, United Nations (October 2018), https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.27.
209
A/C.1/73/L.37, United Nations (October 2018), https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.37.
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suffer from shortfalls. If any country were to develop specific rules, failure
would surely follow. The scope that international law covers, in combination
with the ever-expanding cyberspace, would make developing concrete
doctrine ineffective as it would soon become obsolete.
VI. AN INTRODUCTION TO AMBIGUITY
While the seventeenth century gave birth to international law, it would not
be until the mid-twentieth century that it would begin to flourish. Due to the
rapid development of humanity, international law has always found a need to
continually develop. Its horizons are ever-expanding.210 Political
developments often out-pace the legislation of laws. Thus, the scope of
international law has always been broad and lacking specificity. As noted
previously, sovereignty and customary laws are byproducts of this ambiguity.
The definition of sovereignty has never been fully denoted by the UN, or any
international governing body that has preceded it. Lack of specificity in
situations such as this enhanced the importance of customary law and its role
in international politics. General guidelines and principles come to be
accepted out of pure necessity in order to seek balance between rapid global
changes and slow-moving legislative adaptations. An ambiguous approach to
international law has long been contested especially because it is not
enforceable. For example, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine passed
by the UN was designed to eliminate reliance on a system of etiquette and
aimed to create concrete rules.211 Just as ambiguity is not without its
detractors, the questionable performance of R2P has fostered its own share
of controversy. Due to this, these concurrent questions of enforceability and
applicability, the debate between ambiguous versus concrete international
doctrine has proliferated.
In the case of France, its doctrine neglects to define “effects” in regard to
consequences initiated by foreign cyberspace attacks. While this is not the
first international law doctrine to be fraught with ambiguity, it only builds
upon already ambiguous principles of cybersecurity (which are defined
below). How it “affects” and the resulting “effects” are mostly not definitive
throughout this section. Section 1.1 repeatedly refers to specific “effects” as
constituting retaliation, even on an international scale. They namely apply to
cyber operations that somehow manifest tangible results, such as “large scale

210

H. M. Griffioen, Some Philosophical Struggles with an Ambiguous Phenomenon,
European Academy of Legal Theory (2001-2002),
http://www.dhdi.free.fr/recherches/theoriedroit/memoires/griffioenmemoir.htm.
211
General Assembly resolution 63/308, The Responsibility to Protect, A/RES/63/308, (7
October 2009).
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loss of life or considerable economic damage.”212 However, the availability
and capabilities of malicious cyber-attacks range far beyond this. Perhaps one
of the most common cyberattacks perpetrated today that is not discussed is a
Distributed Denial of Service attack (known as a DDoS attack). The United
States Department of Homeland Security states “all organizations that rely on
network resources are considered potential targets.”213 France, which relies
on network resources, would thus be considered a target. However, such
attacks are prone to causing delays and inaccessibility when they are carried
out. As to matters about those stated strictly by France, there is not necessarily
a correlation. The problem with ‘general practice’ in regard to cybersecurity
is that when France chooses to make physical intervention a countermeasure
to cyberattacks, it opens a Pandora’s Box of potentially detrimental
consequences. As technology develops and cyber threats evolve and change,
there can be no customary principle accepted by all nations regarding how to
respond to perceived threats.
VII. AMBIGUITY: A NECESSARY EVIL
The idea of ambiguity is, in itself flawed, but not nearly as much as
establishing concrete doctrine. Ambiguity regarding France’s doctrine is
reminiscent of the fight to expand the scope of the Responsibility to protect
through the adoption of more liberal doctrine. The French doctrine, along
with its predecessors, is admittedly, plagued by ambiguity in regard to
countermeasures. However, its description of sovereignty violations is
strongly supported with evidence beyond the typical “UN Charter” argument.
Additionally, it sets up guidelines that provide the ability to physically
intervene as a response to cyberspace attacks. While both the US and UK
have mentioned these ideas, France is the first nation to specifically focus on
such in their document making it a direct goal of the report. Yet, its ambiguity
regarding countermeasures raises questions.
Perhaps the case arises in which a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service)
attack is carried out and makes government systems inaccessible for a short
period of time, but nothing pertinent to national security. Could the use of
what the nation considers a “legitimate” attack be skewed to justify an
otherwise unjustified intervention? In this case, where France sees physical
intervention as a just retaliation to detrimental cyberattacks, such physical
212
Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations, Introduction and General International Law in Cyberspace, Cambridge
University Press (2017).
213
Distributed Denial of Service Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/ddosd.
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interventions could occur. Not only does this pose issues concerning France’s
response, but additionally it does not take into consideration if retaliation is
justifiable in international law. The argument could be made that an
intervention (posed as a retaliation) could also qualify as a violation of the
target state’s sovereignty. But there is a definite need for ambiguity and open
interpretation. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all
developed similar doctrines regarding operations in cyberspace. They are
based upon similar definitions of sovereignty and take similar steps regarding
breaches. However, certain parts are ambiguous and for good reason. The
most important part of this multilateral process of international law is that
these three nations all follow the same thought-process regarding violations
of sovereignty and how to respond, regardless of whether or not the latter is
ambiguous. This, in turn creates a customary law of ambiguity and
interpretation regarding countermeasures to malevolent cyberspace
operations against a given state.
France’s move to follow in the footsteps of others has reaffirmed
customary law regarding cyber security and physical intervention as a means
of retaliation. However, this does not mean it should be left as is. This could
possibly lead to rapid escalation of certain crises and presents an extremely
delicate balance left up to individual nations. Individual nations are
responsible for keeping the doctrine in check. The comprehensive
cybersecurity models of these three members of the UN Security Council
(backed by a large number of fellow UN members) is pushing the global
community towards a more comprehensive cybersecurity model.
VIII. THREE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
The previous sections have discussed France’s doctrine and its application
to international law in its current state. The doctrine does draw on preexisting principles and doctrine and is firmly in accordance with international
law. However, does it contribute anything new or meaningful to questions
concerning international law? The following three questions developed by
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor for the U.S. Department of State have
been repeatedly referred to in discussions on cyberspace and its application
to international law. Each question will be examined and then the manner in
which International Law Applicable to Operations in Cyberspace answers,
or fails to answer, will be discussed.
A. How can a use of force regime take into account all of the novel kinds
of effects that states can produce through the click of a button?

https://research.library.fordham.edu/fulr/vol2/iss1/5

10

Katz: France's New Cybersecurity Policy

56

THE ADVANCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2

The French have established that operations conducted in cyberspace
apply to international law. Thus, their approach regarding retaliation is rooted
in its governing authority: the UN. Two important sections of the UN Charter
are stated which instruct how France may interpret and respond with
countermeasures.
1. Article 2, Paragraph 4
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.214
2. Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.215
France has adopted previously accepted principles of international law and
applied them to their operations in cyberspace. Through the inclusion of
sovereignty and customary law, France proves that its doctrine is built on two
pillars of international law. This reflects previously adopted cybersecurity
doctrine from both France and its international partners. Their doctrine
reinforces the idea cybersecurity doctrine is applicable on an international
scale. Furthermore, they reason that since cybersecurity doctrine is applicable
under international law, their retaliation procedures are justified as long as
they follow pre-existing doctrine regarding such. So, not only is cybersecurity
doctrine applicable on an international scale, but France’s specific doctrine is
applicable cybersecurity doctrine.
In and of itself, France’s approach is logical and is in agreement with the
previously discussed questions. And, in this manner, it is are not alone. The
United States has followed a similar path in their adoption of jus ad bellum
and its application to cyberwarfare. Both documents aim to apply old
214

Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 1, United Nations (2019),
https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.
215
Id.

Published by Fordham Research Commons,

11

Fordham Undergraduate Law Review, Vol. 2 [], Art. 5

2020

FORDHAM UNDERGRADUATE LAW REVIEW

57

doctrines to new problems. Nevertheless, this presents the adoption of
ambiguous principles. Koh states that these ambiguities are nothing new and
have existed for many years, especially regarding inter-state diplomacy.216 A
history of ambiguity, combined with the adoption of these previous
principles, is observable in the French doctrine as well. The need for
ambiguity exists solely for the fact that the world rapidly changes and, with
a lack of cohesive thought between states, such a concrete consensus is
increasingly difficult to achieve. France takes a definitive stance regarding
retaliation in accordance with international law precedents, and it is possible
that other countries will follow suit. However, for the time being, they do not
appear to have inspired any further advancements in international
cybersecurity law.
B. What do we do about “dual-use infrastructure” in cyberspace?
Dual-use infrastructure refers to certain cyber systems that employ both a
governmental and civilian use. These are lawful targets under international
law, according to Groups of Governmental Experts and those rules that have
been accepted under international law.217 However, the civilian implications
of such targeted attacks raise questions regarding International Humanitarian
Law. Interpretations on dual-use infrastructure have presented two major
questions, one for the offensive and one for the defensive state: What if an
offensive state protected its military infrastructure by surrounding it with
civilians? What is a defensive state to do if its military objectives are already
in civilian areas?
Is there not a possibility of specifically targeted attacks on these areas to
maximize human suffering? France focuses a significant portion of their
document on these issues. In Section 2.2.2 “Application of the principles
governing the conduct of hostilities,” France sets forth an important
precedent. Defining a military environment in cyberspace is an increasingly
difficult task for a state, and its civilian implications could be unprecedented.
France elaborates on distinction, specifically between both military and
civilian objectives, and the military and civilians themselves. Additionally,
they highlight the important distinction between proportionality and
precaution especially when attempting to justify military action that may
result in civilian casualties.
When defining military targets, “the essential aim of the digital targeting
process is to comply with the military objective criterion in terms of
216

Id.
Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations, Introduction and General International Law in Cyberspace, Cambridge
University Press (2017).
217
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distinction, given the nature of the targets (digital systems and
infrastructure)”.218 In regards to targeting of dual-use infrastructure, “the nonlethal nature of cyber weapons and the possibility of limiting their effects to
a previously identified system contribute to the obligation to choose the
means and methods of attack most likely to avoid, or at least reduce to a
minimum, any incidental loss of civilian lives, injury to civilians or damage
to civilian objects”.219 France inherently uses slight ambiguities throughout
such, but overall compiles a doctrine in accordance with jus in bello that aims
to minimize the overall loss of life in regards to operations occurring against,
and by, the state. Not only does France comply, but repeatedly refers to
minimizing civilian casualties while simultaneously ensuring their
sovereignty.
C. How do we address the problem of attribution in cyberspace?
Attribution in cyberspace is left to the responsibility of individual states.
The ability to attribute in cyberspace is subject to the ability of a state to do
so. The question does not concern international law directly. International
intervention based on attribution is. Again, the topic is characterized by
ambiguity through multiple governmental organizations.220 Individual states
are responsible for locating the source of an ambiguous attack in order to
respond effectively. Cyberspace exacerbates the ability to respond based on
plausible deniability as the laws surrounding it are not clearly defined. France
aims to adopt a state-focused policy for attribution in Article 1.3. Such
attribution includes characterization of the attacks (both technically and their
origin), its implications, and what countermeasures may be taken in
accordance with IHL and the policy as a whole. By participating in a
definitive process of considering attribution, along with encouraging
participation from fellow states in doing so, the doctrine has assisted in
reducing the chances of an incorrectly attributed attack.
IX. CONCLUSION
While sovereignty and customary law are the two shining pillars in
international law, the third duller pillar, ambiguity, tends to have just as much
importance. Despite criticism, the importance of ambiguity should not be
understated. Humanity often develops faster than international lawmakers
can pen the next important policy. Thus, the nations of the world are self218
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accountable when the international community has not taken a stance on say,
cybersecurity. These nations have no guidelines to follow beyond what other
nations have said, if anything at all. National policies drafted at these times
must remain ambiguous so that they may not only apply to developments in
the present, but for the foreseeable future as well. Yet, nations should not
continually develop more and more ambiguous policies as such could lead to
detrimental consequences. For example, in Section VI. An Introduction to
Ambiguity, the idea that an inconsequential threat could lead to an unequal
retaliation is proposed. The ability to retaliate on a scale larger than necessary
(due to ambiguity) is not impossible. Luckily, large-scale retaliation of a
physical nature is regulated by the UN and often subject to international
scrutiny. However, this does not mean that the argument could not be made
that if France were to retaliate on a large scale, they would not be justified
under their recent doctrine.
France has assuredly aligned themselves with the history of International
Law and International Humanitarian Law through the adoption of
sovereignty, customary law, and ambiguity. Despite adopting a traditional
approach on ambiguity, France has eliminated loopholes caused by
previously enacted policies regarding dual-use infrastructure. This, and other
new outlooks from France, come together to make the doctrine an important
precedent to be followed in coming years. The doctrine is largely flexible
regarding technology and cybersecurity, but decisive when it comes to
protecting the lives of civilians.
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